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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cooperatives, a-capitalistic partnerships and solidarity vectors that share the founding values of 
the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers
1 are an integral part of the social economy in the 
same way as associations, mutual insurance companies, unions and foundations. For this 
flourishing economic sector, the central concern is to develop collective projects of which the 
aim is to address the needs and expectations of its members. Its activity is based on “an 
economic project serving an objective of social utility”, revolving around 215  000 
establishments in France in 2007, and representing approximately 8% of GDP (Vercamer, 
2010). 
In 2010, in this sector, there were 2 900 firms within the French agricultural co-operation, 
representing 40% of the national food industry and of those 715 were wine cooperatives, 
producing 50% of the volume for total revenues of 4.8 billion €
2. 
Caught in a vice-like grip between the Common Market Organization (Wine CMO) and 
Common Agricultural Policies (CAP) reforms on the one hand and the increasing globalisation 
of trade, the rising importance of the new producing countries and changing consumption habits 
on the other hand, wine cooperatives have to face an unprecedented crisis of adaptation, as does 
the entire French wine industry. 
The wine cooperatives, unions and SICA (collective agricultural interest companies) in 
Languedoc-Roussillon (LR), which, in 2008 represented a total of 330 firms (Saïsset and Bou 
Saba, 2009) within one of the largest vineyards in the world, account for more than 70% of 
production and have been particularly affected by this phenomenon since 2004. Indeed, the 
2003/2004 campaign, which was marked by a significant drop in bulk production prices, 
triggered a movement of rapprochement, alliances and mergers  - the wine cooperative 
perimeter having decreased by 27% between 2000 and 2009 – but without being driven by any 
clear strategic vision.  
 
In this context of profound transformation and crisis affecting agricultural cooperation in 
Languedoc-Roussillon, the FRCA LR (Regional Agricultural Cooperatives Federation) has 
made available a collective intelligence tool called COOPERFIC
, specifically designed for 
presidents and directors of agricultural cooperatives in this region. It is thanks to the case of this 
management tool that the aim of this paper is to question the specificities of performance 
measurement in wine cooperatives. Indeed, the traditional controlling and financial models, 
mostly based upon efficiency measures (profit / financial resources), do not seem adequate to 
answer the objectives of a sustainable social economy advocated by the cooperatives.  
 
As a consequence, part 1 of this paper will show why their specific corporate governance 
introduces competition between short term maximum payments to their grape suppliers-patrons 
and long term investment potentials, and will define the economic and financial indicators 
which should be considered to rationalize cooperatives’ internal choices. 
Part 2 will describe the design of COOPERFIC
,
  this specific data base which appeared 
necessary to develop an adapted economic and financial measurement model, and will present 
the sample and the exploratory results obtained.  
As far as managerial interest is concerned, we propose some useful guidelines to assist the 
cooperative governance system, taking into account the apparent antinomy of its short term and 
long term objectives. In order for this specific type of firm to reach its economic and social 
objectives, we propose a performance measurement model answering some of these wine 
cooperatives’ Board and management questions. 
                                                 
1 First (consumer) cooperative, created in 1844, in the Manchester area, by a group of weavers. 
2 Source : “Economic and social weight in French agricultural and agri-food cooperation 2010” Coop de France, November 
2010.   2
1. THE THEORETICAL QUESTION OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT FOR 
COOPERATIVES 
1.1. Literature review about cooperatives’ performance measures 
 
1.1.1. Corporate performance 
 
Based on different theories of the firm which make it possible to define the main conceptions of 
the company and its objectives, from the neo classic approach to the systemic approach (Koenig, 
1998), company performance measures appear to be multiple. 
This central question of management science can be broken down into five main components 
deriving from those theories of the firm and their related modes of governance at the crossroads 
of the economy and management: 
-  the company as a “black box” in the neo-classical analysis, focused on maximising 
profit, the unique result pursued by the entrepreneur, arising from the difference between 
total revenues  and implicit and explicit costs (Friedman, 1953). 
-  the managerial company, focused on the agency relationship between shareholders, 
holders of property rights, and salaried management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
focused on the distribution of value between those two categories, resulting in the search 
for balance concerning maximisation of revenue (growth rate) and profitability of 
invested capital (Marris, 1963). 
-  the company as an organisation with multiple decision–makers, referring to  behavioural 
theory (Cyert, 1963; Simon, 1979). Decision-makers are essentially motivated by 
individual satisfaction behaviour, oriented towards multiple objectives in terms of 
production, stocks, sales and profit; 
-  the company as a network of specific contracts based on the neo - institutional theory of 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1989), the company substituting itself for the market, thus 
permitting transactions to be internalised  and saving on a number of costs; 
-  the company viewed as an organisational structure (Mintzberg, 1989) but also as a 
system (Mélèze, 1968; Lemoigne, 1978; Mucchielli, 1998) leading to management by 
objectives  and thus to a multidimensional approach to performance. 
 
In fact, even though a number of researchers have focused on defining it with precision for more 
than 30 years, (Bouquin, 1986; Bescos et al, 1993; Bourguignon, 1995; Lebas, 1995; Bessire, 
1999, among others), firm performance has always been an ambiguous notion that has rarely 
been explicitly defined. 
Frequently associated with pure financial logic, in which efficiency is seen as the capacity to 
make a profit with the least use of resources possible, performance is thus based on indicators 
ranging from global profitability (results/revenue), return on equity (result/ owners´ equity) or 
cash flow. It is also calling upon notions based on governance, clearly oriented towards 
shareholders’ interests with the aim of creating market value, such as Free Cash Flow (Jensen, 
1986) or the ‘Economic Value Added’. This unequivocal perspective, focused on financial 
performance and the preferential satisfaction of shareholders, has been criticised for more than 
ten years because of its short term logic (Pesqueux, 2002). However, in an increasingly unstable 
environment that is globalised and characterised by hyper competition (D’Aveni, 1994), it 
would appear relevant to move towards the measurement of performance at different levels 
depending on the stakeholders involved: shareholders, clients, employees, public opinion, etc. 
 
The approach based on the balanced scorecard future perspective, developed by Norton and 
Kaplan (1996)  presented by its developers as a tool to evaluate strategy and measure 
performance, is part of this evolution. It is based on a combination of financial and operational 
measures classified into four dimensions: financial results, client satisfaction, internal processes   3
and organisational learning. However, this operational tool appears, for some, still to favour too 
much the financial aspects, financial performance being considered the result and the evaluation 
of the other three strategic dimensions of the company. 
 
Thus a notion of global performance has been emerging since the turn of the last century. 
Defined as “the aggregation of economic, social and environmental performances”, this notion 
aims to assess the implementation by the company of declared sustainable development 
strategies, based on alternative, socially responsible, modes of company governance (Pérez, 
2003). This multidimensional concept, difficult to measure technically, has led researchers to 
design new tools: “Sustainability Balanced Scorecard” (SBSC – Hockerts, 2001),  “Total 
Balanced Scorecard” (TBSC – Supizet, 2002), “Triple Bottom Line Reporting” (Elkington, 
1997) and “Global Reporting Initiative” (GRI, an advanced standard of reporting in terms of 
sustainable development, created in 1997). These multi dimensional performance measurement 
models certainly offer a larger scope to the managers, but do not really clarify possibly 
conflicting objectives, such as higher salaries to satisfy employees, and higher profit requested 
by the shareholders, for example. 
 
It seems therefore necessary to develop contingent and adapted performance models, depending 
upon the specific objectives of the prominent stakeholders of a given organisation or firm.  
 
 
1.1.2. Performance in agricultural and wine cooperatives 
 
Cooperatives have common specificities in terms of governance and in the way they operate, 
with consequences for accounting, management and financial aspects, which differentiate them 
from other types of firms: 
-  a cooperative pact based on “a double commitment” of the members – economic , in 
terms of activity, and financial, in terms of capital subscription (De Charrin, 1989) -also 
called “user owner principle” (Krivokapic-Skoko, 2002) 
-  shared accountability between the board and the duo President – Director (Benvenuti, 
1982; Lewi and Perri, 2009) leading to an original dual governance. 
 
However, like other types of company, agricultural cooperatives can also be analysed using 
other theoretical approaches, from the standard economy to the economy of conventions and 
economic sociology through the new institutional economy (Touzard, 2010). Co-operation is 
multi-faceted, which leads Mauget (2008)  to compare the classical agricultural cooperative, 
where the risk factor is the product, with the complex holding group, within which the risk 
factor is the capital employed. 
Cook & al. (2006 and 2008), in turn, emphasise the differences between the traditional form of 
cooperatives and the new models of co-operation. They propose 7 different governance modes, 
integrating the entrepreneurial dimension to varying degrees. They also highlight the notion of 
“collective entrepreneurship”, and “hybrid” (more market-oriented forms of cooperatives), and 
the proactive attitude of stakeholders. 
Based on this diversity, mainly found in the USA, Cook et al (2008) identify two approaches in 
terms of performance measurement: 
-  capital remuneration, through an evaluation of prices paid in “traditional cooperatives” ; 
-  share value and the profitability of invested capital in cooperatives based on “collective 
entrepreneurship”, as a measurement of the standard of entrepreneurial income derived 
from carrying the risk at the level of the cooperative structure. 
 
However, in other large agricultural countries, where new forms of cooperatives are not so 
numerous, it is clear that the economic performance of an agricultural cooperative cannot be   4
judged in terms of “classical” indicators, used for other types of firms, like, for example, net 
result / equity (Forestier and Mauget, 2001), or again profitability- EBIT / revenue (EBITDA / 
revenue for Declerck and Viviani, 2010). Even if Cadudal and Couderc (2008) analyse 
companies further down the line in the French wine industry, including wine cooperatives, from 
the point of view of added value, Amadieu and Viviani (2009), and Maurel (2010) stress that 
wine cooperatives should be considered separately and recommend the use of different 
performance criteria. 
Cames & al. (2001), in a specific study on wine cooperatives in Languedoc-Roussillon, 
highlight the average remuneration per hectare of members as one of the key criteria of 
performance levels for wine cooperatives. Couret (2006) meanwhile, presents the calculation of 
an economic efficiency indicator, called RESECO. When applying it to wine cooperatives in 
Aquitaine, it is equal to the accounting profit before investment remuneration per unit volume 
sold, which appears synthetic (global), easy to calculate and comprehend, once a fair 
“investment remuneration” has been defined. 
Chabin and Viviani (2007) detail the strategic and prospective performance indicators that relate 
to wine cooperatives, adapted from Norton and Kaplan (1996) prospective balanced scorecards. 
Bianchini, Couderc and Marchini (2008) select 6 performance criteria when comparing wine 
cooperatives in Umbria and Languedoc-Roussillon: sales development, average sales price, 
share of  IG wine on total sales, rate of added value, average remuneration of members (per 
hectolitre and per hectare). 
 
Clearly, there is no real consensus on the way to measure agricultural and wine cooperatives 
performances, as, in our opinion, there are always two contradictory objectives which should be 
taken into account when studying these firms, given that these conflicts of interest stem from 
their own specific internal governance system. 
 
 
1.2. A proposal for a specific economic performance measurement model for wine 
cooperatives  
 
If a cooperative can be defined as a user-owned, user-controlled and user-benefited business 
organization, then the following proposal can be adopted for wine processing cooperatives: “The 
organisation and the common achievement of more than one agricultural enterprise, of a 
vertically integrated activity aiming at product development in the market, so that on the one 
hand the members keep the control of their own enterprise, while on the other hand they are 
obliged to delegate a part of the management of the integrated production to external organisms, 
that is the Board of Directors (BoD) and the cooperative management” (Saccomandi, 1992). 
In order to choose some economic performance objectives and criteria for the cooperatives, one 
must first understand their governance system, schematically described below: 
 











(Managing director)  
Board of 
Directors 
(President)    5
The relationships inside the cooperative can be simplified and illustrated with this triangle: the 
first angle represents the members, who are both the main raw material suppliers and property 
rights owners of the cooperative; the second the Board of Directors (BoD), composed by a 
varying number of members-owners electing their President of the Board; and the third the 
management, formed, at the least, by the managing Director. The members share the strategic 
control with the BoD, as the management shares the operational and tactical control with the 
BoD, represented by its President (Benvenuti, 1982). A ‘harmonious’ governance is therefore 
strongly dependent upon the relationships President-BoD-members on one side, and BoD- 
President-managing Director on the other. 
 
It is a considerably easier task to outline the governance of the firm if we look at a private firm 
managed by a single owner-entrepreneur than if we take the much more complicated 
cooperative organisation, because of the complex relationships that exist between the various 
stakeholders. For example, there is a specific conflict of interest built into the cooperative 
system: the members are both the firm’s owners and its suppliers of agricultural raw materials. 
They consequently most often wish to immediately obtain prices higher than the market price 
for their productions, to the detriment of the cooperative’s long term investments, which are 
potentially financed by the cooperative reserves, themselves built from its accumulated residual 
profit. Facing this specific “cooperative dilemma”, the growers-members elected to the BoD, 
and particularly the President of the Board, in agreement with the management, need to 
carefully balance short term individual grower-member interest with long term collective value 
building. 
 
This question always generates conflicts between members and managers of the 
cooperatives. The current market crisis leads to increased distribution of surplus to members of 
the cooperative and allows farms to overcome a lack of decent revenues. But on the other hand, 
precisely in view of a market crisis, the cooperatives should innovate and invest in order to 
create or defend their competitive advantage. 
 
On top of the classical “agency costs” question between the growers, co-owners of the 
cooperative, who try to control their managing director in order to overcome potential conflicts 
of interest, there is an ‘internal’, built-in, conflict of interest specific to the cooperatives,   
between the short term higher prices paid to the growers-suppliers and the long term building of 
a residual profit and cash flow decided by the Board of the same growers-members of the 
cooperative. 
Although parallel to the ‘free cash-flow’ problem between the manager and the shareholders, 
treated by Jensen (1986), which could allow firms' managers to finance projects earning low 
returns, the question here will be exclusively centred on how to try and understand the way 
growers-suppliers-owners solve this internal conflict choosing short or longer term revenue, 
leaving aside the more classical “agency costs” problem between the cooperative manager and 
cooperative members.  
 
When focusing on the wine cooperatives of the Languedoc-Roussillon region, the question 
becomes, therefore, how to balance: 
-  A short term objective: to maximise farmers’ revenues (price of grapes purchased paid 
by the cooperative). A reasonable objective should at least be to cover the full costs 
(including the farmer’s salary) of cultivating a vineyard. The remuneration for the grapes 
delivered / hectare cultivated should therefore be higher than the costs incurred… 
Assuming that 4 000 € is the average revenue estimated to justify the costs and the work 
on one hectare of a ‘standard’ vineyard, the cooperatives remunerating their members at 
a level inferior to 4 000 €/hectare do not ‘satisfy’ the members: they cannot cover their   6
full expenses (amortizations included) and pay themselves a ‘basic’ salary of 1 200 € per 
month (a cost of about 20 000 € per year,  including social contributions expenses), 
when cultivating their 20 hectares vineyard (average size for a grower-member in 
Languedoc-Roussillon) (Montaigne & al., 2006).  
-  A long term objective: to keep some profit within the cooperative, to be reinvested 
(innovation, brand, international development, etc.), in order to improve the competitive 
positioning of the cooperative’s wines and therefore the price of goods sold (and, 
hopefully, the price of grapes purchased) in the future. Given that these wine 
cooperatives have made an important and recent investment in their wine-making 
capacities, they show relatively large amounts of amortization costs (6% on sales on 
average). An assumption of no loss (0 % net profit on sales) to be deducted from the 
cooperative reserves would therefore give a comparatively ‘competitive’ level of a 5% to 
6% cash flow (and slightly higher than the private French wine firms and wine 
merchants which delivered about a 5% cash flow on sales in the year 2006 (Cadudal and 
Couderc, 2008). 
 
A balanced analysis of cooperatives’ performance should rely on the use of both those financial 
and economic indicators. It should be mentioned that the financial ratios based on "Earnings 
before interest and tax" (EBIT) or "Profit" have not been judged by the academic literature as 
really relevant to estimate cooperative performances, because residual value claim, i.e. 
cooperative dividend distribution to the growers, generally, is not authorized in these 
organisations.  At a first glance, creating a surplus to be kept within the cooperative therefore 
appears to be only secondary to the highest possible payment of the grapes brought by the 
growers-owners.  
 
Over the past fifteen  years, the main part of  the wine cooperatives in Languedoc-Roussillon  
have undertaken continuous and significant, even massive, tangible investments in order to go 
on improving wine making and adapting product quality to cope with market demand - a 
“profound transformation” following massive replanting of vineyards, described by Touzard and 
Laporte (1998) -. Thus, this current important level of amortization, representing a main part of 
fixed costs, should be taken into account, as it largely influences cash-flow and the creation of 
internal resources, allowing cooperatives to undertake new projects and developments. 
Notwithstanding this current high level of amortization, however, only a retained profit will, in 
the long run, allow the cooperative to undertake some risky future investment, and should be 
sought! 
Are these objectives of higher remuneration of growers and higher cash flow really 
contradictory? They indeed create a conflict between an improved short term revenue for the 
farmers-patrons, and a better sales value creation in the long term when reinvesting the surplus. 
But this apparent opposition could be solved with a better economic education of the BoD 
members, as the correct question is: which share of the value created should be kept within the 
firm in order to avoid a downgrading of the cooperative management evaluation, leading to a 
loss of grower-members on the one hand and to promote the undertaking of profitable 
investments in order to increase the firm’s economic efficiency on the other hand?  
 
 
2. THE DESIGN OF THE COOPERFIC
© DATA BASE AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
OBTAINED FROM THE SPECIFIC MODEL 
 
2.1. History and design of COOPERFIC
©, a management tool appropriation question 
  7
In 2004, a harsh economic crisis hit the wine sector of Languedoc-Roussillon. Since then, the 
wine cooperatives have been facing serious problems in terms of maintaining suitable levels of 
payment for growers-members, stopping the uprooting of vines and profitably commercializing 
their products. Committed to the protection of wine cooperatives’ economy, their federation 
(FRCA LR), supported by the Languedoc-Roussillon Region, initiated in 2006 a project with the 
Universities of Montpellier to create a management tool dedicated to cooperatives’ directors, in 
order to develop their strategic management competencies and particularly through 
benchmarking, but also to anticipate restructuring plans and mergers, and to improve 
cooperatives’ performance.  
At the same time the FRCA-LR targeted a sample of 19 volunteer wine cooperatives which 
identified specific “scorecard axes
3”. In 2007 - 2008, performance indicators were constructed 
and affected to the various agricultural sectors
4 (wine, olives, fruit and vegetables…).  
In 2009 questionnaires were elaborated and economic and financial data
5 were collected in order 
to feed the COOPERFIC
© database and make it operational. At the beginning of 2010, the tool 
was accessible online and 80 cooperatives
6 joined the project, allowing their directors to access 
a board of 12 financial performance indicators. Currently, cooperatives directors can check in 
and visualize the evolution of indicators over the years; they can also run a benchmark by 
comparing their own economic information to the regional average of other cooperatives.  
 
A complex reality was emerging, according to the approach “Network of Stakeholders” 
analyzed by Muchielli (1998), from the cross relationships between institutions, individuals and 
objects, as shown in the diagram in Exhibit 1. 
This type of tool, due to its new “information system” characteristics, and the way it is made 
available (on line), has never been tested before in the agricultural cooperative sector in France
7 
Thus, taking into account Chiffoleau and Touzard’s research (2007) about localised agri-food 
business systems (SYAL)
8of LR, revealing interactions between wine cooperatives managers of 
the area around Béziers, mainly focused on technology and politics and rarely on sales and 
management, it also raises question on the adoption of such computerised management software 
tools. 
 
Indeed, following the emergence of information systems, there has been considerable debate 
about the effects of the usage of ICT (information and communication technologies) on 
managers. The question of passive use of ICT has been raised, considering that managers are 
only passive users, as they have no power to decide how ICT should be utilised. (Leavitt and 
Whisler, 1958; Kemble and Mc Loughlin, 1995).The active use of ICT by managers has been 
studied by Applegate et al. (1988) and MacKay (1992), and for those authors, managers adapt 
the usage of ICT to their organisations and, therefore, decide themselves how to utilise them. 
Yet we note at the same time that the introduction of the COOPERFIC
© tool into this 
environment brought about the emergence of specific needs in terms of socio-economic issues, 
                                                 
3 “Score card Axes” are inspired by Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) work on “balanced score card”; these axes were adapted to fit 
to the organizational aspects and managerial specificities of agricultural cooperatives. They are: Financial axis, Commercial 
axis, Human resources axis, Governance axis, Production axis and Process axis. 
4 Even though COOPERFIC
 tool contains performance indicators related to several cooperative sectors, our study concerns 
only the wine performance indicators.  
5 Main Source: Diane (SCRL) Database, covering 75% of the agricultural cooperative perimeter of LR region. 
6 80 « Interactive Cooperatives », accepted the e-convention proposed by COOPERFIC
 and joined the project. 
7 We have been able to identify some limited constructions of data bases carried out by the wine observatory of the Hérault 
department and the Ministry of Agriculture. A study has been carried out by Montpellier Supagro and INRA in 2003 on a 
national basis, bringing methodological contributions towards the creation of a wine observatory in LR, but this project never 
materialised. 
8 Definition: production and service organisations (agricultural production units, agri-food, commercial, service enterprises, etc.) 
associated based on their characteristics, and   their operating modes in a specific locality. The context, the products, people, 
their institutions, their know-how, their behaviour, their networks, combine together in a given area to produce a form of agri-
food organisation on a given spatial scale” (CIRAD-SAR, 1996)   8
and not socio-political as had been noted till now. Thus it demonstrates, de facto, the vital need 
of wine cooperatives in LR to commit themselves to new strategies and modes of governance, 
but adapted to their specific environment.  
 
Moreover, relations between growers-members, as persons and economic actors belonging to a 
group, and their cooperative and its management, as a specific firm that should embody a 
collective project, are one of the main key success factors in agricultural cooperatives. This 
original “human dimension” leads to a particular way of management in order to strengthen 
members-cooperative’s link as well as to prevent member’s “free rider” behaviour (Cook, 
1995). This in a sort of “backward marketing”, which has to be deeper and more sustainable 
than a mere communication plan, and that requires extensive means: technical advice, 
information meetings, trainings, specific commissions (vineyards, investments, finance, etc…), 
for example.       
 
Consequently, the aim of the COOPERFIC
© tool today is to design and implement an analytical 
and decision-aid tool for economic and financial  decisions, specific to cooperative firms and 
their subsidiaries. The available financial indicators are presented in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. COOPERFIC
©’s on line financial indicators 
Source : COOPERFIC
© - FRCA LR 
 
Facing structural adaptation questions concerning the wine cooperatives, the FRCA-LR has 
furthermore given careful consideration to the prevention of economic risk during 2009 and 
2010 via a specific think tank in order to create a regional “Warning System”. This group 
examined the 4 risk dimensions, from very short term (less than 12 months) to long term 
dimensions (3-4 years), dealing with the six following interdependent themes: finance, sales, 
production and products, human resources, decision making/cooperative governance, external 
environment (transversal).   
One of the many useful results of this qualitative and quantitative approach led to a selection of 
short and long term financial performance indicators within the COOPERFIC
© data base, 
presented in the next paragraph, which should be helpful when trying to solve the cooperatives’ 
internal conflict of interest previously described. 
 
 
2.2. Presentation of the sample and variables used to test specific wine cooperatives 
performance measurements 
 
This analysis of cooperative performance has been based on an ad hoc sample of 45 wine 
cooperatives (the ones among the 80 which displayed a complete set of relevant variables, 
Indicators Thema 
Turnover (€)   Activity 
Salaries and fringe benefits (% turnover)  
Fixed costs  
Amortization costs (% turnover)  
Members’ remuneration for grapes delivered (€/ha) 
Performance 
Cash flow (% turnover)  
Capital expenditure rate (% turnover)   Capital expenditure  
Global indebtedness (% turnover) 
Indebtedness 
Middle and long term indebtedness rate (%) 
Working capital (days of turnover)  
Financial structure   Working capital requirements (days of turnover) 
Cash resources (days of turnover)   9
during this phase of the data base construction), associated to the– “Interactive Cooperatives”. In 
the following table we describe the main features of this sample: 
 




Number of cooperatives   45 
Survey period  November 2010 to January 2011 
Type of survey  COOPERFIC
© financial data  
Geographic repartition 
(districts) 
-  Aude   13     
-  Hérault 15 
-  Gard 13 
-  Pyrénées Orientales 4 
Main product sold (vol. > 
60% for bulk or bottle) 
-  Bulk wine 22 
-  Bottled wine 10 
-  Mixed wine sales 13 
  
Concerning performance measurement, we made a selection of indicators based on the specific 
cooperative’s model as described in part 1.2. Both the selection and the model contain some 
financial and economic indicators, in order to characterize the “cooperative dilemma”.  The 
short and long term terms dimensions of these indicators will allow us to test whether their 
peculiar governance is able (or not) to ‘balance’ the immediate individual growers’ objective 
with the firm’s future potentialities.  
 
In a cooperative Profit and Loss Statement, the first deduction from the sales turnover comes 
from the purchase of grapes to the growers-suppliers, who also are the owner-members of this 
collectively owned firm. The first desire of these ‘special’ suppliers is to obtain the highest 
possible price for each ton of grapes delivered to the cooperative cellar, as it constitutes their 
own private grape growing farm revenue. But the higher the price paid for these purchases, the 
lower the added value will become, and the lower the residual value or profit. Then, in a similar 
way to the agency classical conflicts of interest, the growers-members, in a more direct way, 
also compete with the management and employees for revenues, which can certainly explain 
their reluctance to hire ‘too much’ new and more competent talent. 
 
Consequently, for the purpose of testing this specific economic performance measurement model 
for wine cooperatives, the variables chosen to illustrate the “short term approach” tackle the value 
repartition of the wine sector ‘backward’, as farmers’ revenues maximisation first comes from an 
optimal immediate remuneration and/or minimum fixed costs, whereas the “long term approach” 
deals with the relative positioning in the wine sector ‘forward’ at the level of the firm (higher 
sales price and turnover, leading to higher cash flow).  
 
The hypothesis there is that value creation ‘forward’ will however spread all over the wine chain 
and the growers-members remuneration in the long run, given that pertinent investments and sales 
development will be permitted by a sufficient cash flow production.    
 
 short term approach : grape grower’s remuneration level 
-  remuneration for the grapes delivered/hectolitre (€/hl) 
-  remuneration for the grapes delivered/hectare cultivated (€/ha) 
-  fixed costs
9/hectolitre  (€/hl) 
-  fixed costs/turnover (%)  
 
                                                 
9 Fixed costs are defined here as employees salaries, wages and social insurances + amortizations and provisions.    10
 long term approach :  the level of the firm and value chain sustainability  
-  mean price/hectolitre (€/hl) 
-  sales turnover/hectare cultivated (€/ha) 
-  cash flow
10/turnover (%) 
-  cash flow/hectare cultivated (€/ha)  
-  cash flow/hectolitre (€/hl) 
-  cash flow/[amortizations + provisions] (%) 
 
Considering that agricultural cooperatives’ cash flow is quite often mainly composed by 
amortizations and provisions (the surplus profit appearing as secondary), the last indicator of the 
long term approach we propose - cash flow / (amortizations + provisions) – appears as a proxy 
to evaluate to which degree the governance bodies of the wine cooperative are willing to create 
more equity capital at the level of the firm in order to increase its future competitive advantage 
(when this indicator is greater than 1, it indicates that some residual value (net profit is then > 0) 
has been kept within the cooperative and increases the capacity to undertake and finance new 
projects. 
 
Finally, we propose an original indicator, to our knowledge not mentioned or studied before 
within the agricultural cooperatives’ sector: cash flow per hectare / members’ remuneration per 
hectare (%).  
This ratio is aimed at representing the balance of influence in the cooperative governance 
between the members-growers’ point of view and the firm’s (cooperative’s) dealing with a 
systemic backward and forward view of the wine chain. Looking at the level and the place of the 
value creation, it may then help characterize the type of cooperative’s governance and its related 
strategic orientations.      
 
The data have been averaged over three years (vintages 2006, 2007 and 2008), in order to 
mitigate possible ‘exceptional’ yearly financial result. The descriptive statistics of the variables 




2.3. Results from a specific performance measurement model for the cooperatives 
 
2.3.1. General survey and preliminary findings 
 
The ad hoc sample of 45 wine cooperatives represents 2 550 000 hl of wine production and a 
total turnover situated between 220 and 240 M€ over 2006-2008, which  represents 16% of the 
same statute firms’ whole number and 25% of both global production and turnover in 
Languedoc-Roussillon.     
 
The following graphic shows this sample’s average turnover, which is roughly 60% higher than 
the whole population’s average turnover, but varying in the same way (COOPERFIC
© covers 
180 cooperatives’ financial data):                           
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COOPERFIC
© - FRCA LR 
 
There is a great heterogeneity among these 45 cooperatives which receive grapes from vineyards 
varying from about 200 up to 3 000 ha, with a median yield of 60 hl per ha, therefore producing 
around 50  000 hectolitres. Their average turnover (2006-2008), just above 5 million euros, 
results in an average net loss (and, at best, an almost null residual value), and both these 
variables show quite a large standard deviation. 
 
These generalized losses over 2006-2008 confirm that, when facing market difficulties, the 
trade-off between the remuneration of the growers-members and the building of capital reserves 
for future new projects of these cooperatives massively bends in favour of the short term higher 
payment to the cooperatives’ patrons… 
 
Table 3. Main statistics for structural characteristics of the wine cooperatives sample (06-08) 
 
   N  Mean  Median  Sum  Minimum Maximum  Stand. Deviation 
Surface (ha cultivated)  45 1 000  855 44 991 197 3 008  700
Volume produced (hl)  45 56 709  49 798 2 551 921 12 166 202 011  42 113
Average yield per ha   45 57 60 2  565 27 80  13
Turnover (€)  45 5 160 616  3 721 207 232 227 732 671 361 27 039 739  5 127 652
Profit (€)  45 -223 406  -77 316 -10 053 290 -4 139 809 47 537  626 366
 
This growers-members demand for higher remuneration of their grapes appears fully justified 
when analyzing the variables chosen to represent the short term and long term approaches we 
suggest. Over the 45 cooperatives studied, the average (06-08) grape-growers remuneration of 
2 737 € per hectare has been clearly insufficient to meet the 4 000 € per ha needed to cover their 
full cultivation costs. With such low payment for their grapes, as they cannot pay themselves 
any salary , nor account for a normal amortization of their farms (the other operating expenses 
having already drawn all the cash they received), one can easily understand that they cannot 
imagine lowering it for longer terms purposes!  
 
More generally, concerning these short term and long term variables, an F test of means to 
verify the impact of size, type of production quality standard (protected origin or not) and type 
of product sold (bulk and bottles), which appear as important control variables, showed 
significant non parametric differences only for the type of product sold: the grape growers 
remuneration went up from 41 € per hl and 2 579 € per ha for bulk to 76 € per hl and 3 279 € per   12
ha for bottles. This means that a downward integration strategy can possibly improve their 
revenues, but, on average, stays far from being satisfactory or even bearable…  
 
 
2.3.2. Short term approach 
 
With an average price per hectolitre of about 50 €, for an average yield of less than 60 hl per ha 
cultivated, one can understand that the average remuneration received by the cooperative 
patrons, well under the necessary 4 000 €/ha for an average 20 ha vineyard, is far from sufficient 
for the farm to be ‘viable’, as demonstrated by Montaigne & al. (2006). It can explain the 
interest of the vested interest of these cooperatives Boards to keep the firm’s fixed costs at the 
lowest possible level, when they can vary so widely from 6.35 € to 413.66 € per hl (and with a 
high standard deviation). It might be a false question, however, as, when standardized by the 
sales turnovers, these fixed costs, which average about 20%, show a relatively very low standard 
deviation of less than 7%.  
 






per hl (€) 
Grape growers 
remuneration 
per ha (€) 
Fixed costs 
per hl 
% Fixed costs/ 
Turnover 
N  45 45 45 45
Mean  51.72 2 737 26.10 20.45%
Median  43.25 2 644 13.35 19.04%
Minimum  26.66 1 539 6.35 11.11%
Maximum  195.00 5 610 413.66 47.32%
Stand. Deviation  27.95 869 60.19 6.84%
          
As far as “wine making costs” and more particularly fixed costs are concerned, we can observe 
that no correlation (see Exhibit 2: Table of bi-lateral correlations for the main variables and 
indicators of the research) exists between the size of the cooperative (wine volume of production 
level) and fixed costs per hectolitre, given that the correlation coefficient is hardly -0.11 and not 
significant, whereas many grape growers and cooperative directors highlight the necessary 
economies of scales coming from an increasing volume of production in order to face national 
and international competition. It seems this mean of raising competitiveness doesn’t apply to all 
kinds of wine cooperatives and certainly depends on their strategic orientations. In fact, quite 
often, the bigger the cooperative’s size, the more staff it requires, particularly to develop new 
management functions arising from their increasing activity (e.g. backward relations, accounting 
control, normalisation, coordination, etc.).  
This indicator, as well as the % of fixed costs on sales turnover, reaches a highly positive and 
significant level (respectively 0.706 and 0.428), however, when compared to the sales turnover. 
This reflects the fact that some fixed costs (product, process or organizational innovation, 
marketing, sales management, etc.) can help build a real ‘value creation’ for the bulk or bottle 
sold, although they do not always lead to a higher profit for the cooperative.  
 
It consequently appears that members’ payment is paradoxically in close and positive significant 
correlation with fixed costs if we compare remuneration for the grapes delivered/hectolitre and 
fixed costs/hectolitre (€/hl) or % of fixed costs on sales turnover (respectively 0.835 and 0.398). 
This statement of fact tends to prove that these two indicators must not systematically be 
opposed in a reduction costs’ unequivocal perspective which appears to be too simplistic and 
may even be value destroying. In this way, tangible (amortizations) and intangible (job creation 
and human capital) investments seem to improve short term economic efficiency via co-  13
operators remuneration. Therefore, many grape growers’ obsession of aiming at a strict costs 
decrease, through a focused benchmark on “wine making costs”, in order to maximize their 
revenue may be incoherent and even counter productive.  
  
 
2.3.3. Long term approach 
 
The current crisis has particularly hit the Languedoc-Roussillon region, and wine prices have 
fallen far below the necessary levels to insure a decent living for the average growers-members 
of the cooperatives. It averages 62 €/hl, for example, for bulk sales in this ad hoc sample, 
leading in this case to a turnover of  3 850 € per ha cultivated, inferior to the full costs to 
produce the grapes, and notwithstanding the cooperative wine-making costs (11.50 € per hl for 
bulk). 
 
One can therefore easily understand that the cooperatives’ boards will vote for the highest 
possible price to be paid for the grapes produced by their suppliers-members, and forget all 
potentially fruitful long term expenses or investments… The average 6% amortization on sales 
is not even covered to result in the acceptance of a net loss, reducing the average cash flow on 
sales to a mere 3% (although still representing almost 6% of a ‘poor’ growers remuneration), 
and the weight of the final average cash flow on these amortizations does not reach 1 (which 
would reflect a null profit). 
  





per hl sold (€) 
Turnover 

















N  45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Mean  103.17  4 967 3.04% 156 2.62 42.38% 5.71%
Median  69.12 4  195 4.41% 209 3.44 68.70% 7.63%
Minimum  37.54 2  705 -25.84% -979 -29.44 -477.82% -30.73%
Maximum  873.89 23  866 9.17% 858 31.50 132.40% 20.49%
Stand. Deviation  124.71 3  243 6.66% 292 7.67 96.82% 10.30%
          
The higher the price per hectolitre sold, however, the higher the expected cash flow/hl 
(significant correlation coefficient of 0,472, and similar correlations can be observed for the 
other cash flow indicators), which would suggest that when a ‘decent’ remuneration of the 
growers-members is reached, the cooperatives boards agree to reserve and affect some of the 
value created to longer term objectives. The turnover per hectare, to a lesser degree, as it might 
be linked to the ‘hectomaniac’ strategy described below, confirms this finding. 
 
2.3.4. Relations and balance between short term and long term approach 
 
The grape-growers remuneration per hectolitre is obviously highly dependent on  the mean price 
per hl sold by the cooperatives (significant correlation coefficient of 0.912), and relatively 
independent (negative non significant correlation) of the volume of wine they produce. The 
always higher ‘critical size’ motto seem to lead to an ‘hectomaniac’, and cost fighting attitude 
which does not produce the expected ‘higher value’ for the growers-members of the 
cooperatives in Languedoc-Roussillon .  
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Obviously, as prices stay low, the members remuneration drops, even if the boards decide to 
create a loss when distributing previous capital reserves to the growers, and sacrificing the cash 
flow level, as shown in Figure 3 below. This is in fact acting traditionally for the cooperatives,  
smoothing over bad vintages, appearing as a crisis cushion, on condition that these setbacks do 
not last too long …  
 
















              Source : COOPERFIC
© - FRCA LR 
 
Coming back to the growers’ remuneration, the first and most important short term indicator of 
cooperative economic health, it clearly appears that it is linked (significant correlation 
coefficient of 0.535) to the mean price per hectolitre sold. Figure 4 below shows that only 3 out 
of the 45 cooperatives studied reach the 4 000 € minimum target level of average remuneration 
per hectare over the years 2006 to 2008. 
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Cash flow (% turnover) 
Furthermore, crossing the two indicators which are the more emblematic ones as far as the two 
approaches of wine cooperatives performance are concerned, leads us to distinguish three main 
groups of firms with different balances and dynamics, as shown below.   
          



















            
Group 1 (G 1) is made up of 5 cooperatives (11% of our sample) showing the best relative 
performances with well balanced levels of indicators: highest grape growers’ payment per 
hectare (superior to 4 000 €/ha), and a cash-flow rate of 3% for 2 of them and varying from 5 to 
9% for 3 of them. In this group, both short term and long term or backward and forward 
objectives have been achieved so that these wine cooperatives and their members can envisage 
the future with some optimism.  
 
On the contrary, Group 2 (G 2), is composed of 13 cooperatives (29% of our sample), all with 
an average producers’ remuneration level of less than 4  000 €/ha and a cash-flow rate 
systematically inferior to 3% is the worst as far as the balance of performance is concerned. For 
these firms, the economic future is dark and doubtful. In this context, the main risks consist of  
growers-members leaving their cooperative (for a better performing one, or to produce their own 
wine), as well as suspension of payments and potential liquidation.      
 
The third Group (G 3), which is the largest, consists of 27 cooperatives (60%) with an 
insufficient level of member’s payment (inferior to 4  000 €/ha) counterbalanced by a quite 
important cash-flow ratio, reaching 3% to 9%. This position and potential perpetuation of this 
Group requires attention and some specific monitoring. There, the COOPERFIC
© cooperative’s 
warning system becomes quite useful, in order to help these organizations to prevent growing 
economic and financial risks.  
 
Finally, observing the ratio cash flow / grape growers remuneration (Table 5), we can highlight 
its large variations from - 30.7% to 20.5%, with an average level of 8-10% for this original 
indicator. This mean could appear as acceptable, as long as the growers remuneration stays 
above 4 000 €/ha, but it seems extremely difficult to for the moment to recommend an optimal 
amount, which would represent a cooperative well balanced performance level. It seems to be 
Members’ payment (€/ha) 
G 1 
G 3   16
particularly due to its nature, the table of correlations showing no links with the other variables 
in Exhibit 2, and it will therefore necessitate more in depth explorations.     
 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The review of the literature concerning the performance and governance of cooperatives shows 
that in this type of firm, there still exists an unresolved question of performance measurement. 
The financial ratios, mostly based upon efficiency measures (profit / financial resources), do not 
seem adequate to estimate cooperative performances. Due to a specific “double commitment” as 
grower-suppliers and member-owners of their patrons, cooperatives face a problem of dual 
performance objectives (short term remuneration for the growers, long term value creation for 
the owners) and find it difficult to establish balanced governance in order to solve this internal 
conflict of interests, that we call the “cooperative dilemma”. 
 
The economic crisis in the wine sector  exacerbates the practical question of how to balance 
economic indicators such as a short term grower remuneration higher than 4 000 € per hectare 
with a minimum 5% longer term cash flow on sales in the Languedoc-Roussillon wine 
cooperatives. The test of this specific model, designed thanks to COOPERFIC
’s decision-aid 
tool, has confirmed that both the average growers’ remuneration and the cooperatives’ cash flow 
are insufficient, as only 5 out of the 45 cooperatives studied reach these indicators levels. All the 
other cooperatives fail to  satisfy their suppliers-members’ need for a decent revenue, and 13 of 
them have sacrificed their long term interests and distributed their previously accumulated   
capital reserves in order to smooth over the detrimental effects of low prices on the wine market. 
 
Quite clearly, this exploratory research is also showing that growers’ remuneration is linked to a 
higher price obtained for their sales of bulk or bottled wine, much more than a reduction of fixed 
costs, which, in the long run, would condemn more value creation for the cooperative patrons. 
When the price per hectolitre sold increases, the higher the expected cash flow becomes, which 
suggests that when a satisfactory revenue for the cooperatives’ growers-members is reached, 
their boards tend to agree to affect some of the value created to their capital reserves and to 
longer term objectives. 
 
This study proposes a model based on short and long term economic indicators, which can help 
cooperative managers and boards reach balanced decisions. But it also shows that a larger size 
does not produce the expected economies of scale. Public and professional institutions spend a 
lot of efforts to convince many Languedoc-Roussillon cooperatives to merge or associate. They 
should also take into account the question of those cooperatives’ potential tangible and 
particularly intangible (marketing, sales organization, etc) investments, in order to create more 
value for their products and their patrons in the long run.  
 
The COOPERFIC
© tool therefore appears to be an appropriate mean to measure and analyse, 
beyond the merely financial dimension, cooperatives’ global performance. It will allow 
developing, as far as needed, suited indicators related to the various axes of a sustainable social 
economy performance. In this way, COOPERFIC
© can be seen as a pertinent and pedagogic 
management tool, offering cooperatives Presidents and directors a specific benchmark in order 
to better run their company, bearing in mind both members and firm interests. 
However, this original tool entails its own limits: it must be used by a significant number of 
cooperatives to be adapted, and should regularly be updated, as existing gap between on line’s 
indicators and cooperatives’ present situation can be prejudicial. It follows that this exploratory 
research is obviously limited because of the small actual number of adhering cooperatives. It   17
should therefore be completed in the future with a larger survey, including more wine 
cooperatives. 
Finally, it should also be enhanced in the near future by also using non financial indicators in 
order to have a vision of global and sustainable performance (economic, social and 
environmental), taking into account specific strategic groups of cooperatives or specific 
productions (wines of guaranteed origin or not).  
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Exhibit 1 The diagram below illustrates the concept of the Internal and External Spaces of the innovation project COOPERFIC© according to the approach 
“Network of Stakeholders” highlighting the different relationships (Alex Muchielli, the systemic and communicational approach to organisations) 
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Exhibit 2: Table of bi-lateral correlations for the main variables (06-08) and indicators of the research 
 
Table of correlations  












































Volume produced (hl)  Correlation   1,000  ,527 -,084 -,075 ,184 -,110  -,231 -,128 -,076 ,179 ,122 ,034  ,181 
Signification   .  ,000* ,582 ,623 ,225 ,471  ,127 ,402 ,621 ,239 ,426 ,826  ,235 
Turnover (€)  Corrélation  ,527  1,000 -,326 ,696 ,504 ,706  ,428 ,722 ,726 ,019 ,210 ,311  ,132 
Signification   ,000*  . ,029* ,000* ,000* ,000*  ,003* ,000* ,000* ,902 ,165 ,037*  ,386 
Profit (€)   Corrélation  -,084  -,326 1,000 -,250 -,047 -,100  -,316 -,131 -,092 ,496 ,676 ,690  ,314 
Signification   ,582  ,029* . ,098* ,758 ,515  ,035* ,391 ,550 ,001* ,000* ,000*  ,035 
Grape growers 
remuneration per hl 
(€) 
Corrélation -,075  ,696 -,250 1,000 ,746 ,835  ,398 ,912 ,915 -,111 ,145 ,295  ,062 
Signification   ,623  ,000* ,098 . ,000* ,000*  ,007* ,000* ,000* ,467 ,343 ,049*  ,688 
Grape growers 
remuneration per ha 
(€) 
Corrélation ,184  ,504 -,047 ,746 1,000 ,452  -,026 ,535 ,666 ,083 ,283 ,292  ,208 
Signification   ,225  ,000* ,758 ,000* . ,002*  ,864 ,000* ,000* ,588 ,060 ,051  ,169 
Fixed costs per hl (€)  Corrélation  -,110  ,706 -,100 ,835 ,452 1,000  ,680 ,978 ,924 -,037 ,289 ,494  ,061 
Signification   ,471  ,000* ,515 ,000* ,002* .  ,000* ,000* ,000* ,809 ,054 ,001*  ,689 
% Fixed costs / 
Turnover  
Corrélation -,231  ,428 -,316 ,398 -,026 ,680  1,000 ,611 ,528 -,130 ,012 ,154  -,112 
Signification   ,127  ,003* ,035* ,007* ,864 ,000*  . ,000* ,000* ,393 ,939 ,312  ,465 
Mean price per hl sold 
(€) 
Corrélation -,128  ,722 -,131 ,912 ,535 ,978  ,611 1,000 ,969 -,047 ,276 ,472  ,075 
Signification   ,402  ,000* ,391 ,000* ,000* ,000*  ,000* . ,000* ,759 ,067 ,001*  ,626 
Turnover per ha (€)  Corrélation  -,076  ,726 -,092 ,915 ,666 ,924  ,528 ,969 1,000 ,030 ,361 ,517  ,153 
Signification   ,621  ,000* ,550 ,000* ,000* ,000*  ,000* ,000* . ,842 ,015* ,000*  ,314 
% Cash Flow / 
Turnover  
Corrélation ,179  ,019 ,496 -,111 ,083 -,037  -,130 -,047 ,030 1,000 ,845 ,662  ,930 
Signification   ,239  ,902 ,001* ,467 ,588 ,809  ,393 ,759 ,842 . ,000* ,000*  ,000* 
Cash Flow per ha (€)  Corrélation  ,122  ,210 ,676 ,145 ,283 ,289  ,012 ,276 ,361 ,845 1,000 ,938  ,757 
Signification   ,426  ,165 ,000* ,343 ,060 ,054  ,939 ,067 ,015* ,000* . ,000*  ,000* 
Cash Flow per hl (€)  Corrélation  ,034  ,311 ,690 ,295 ,292 ,494  ,154 ,472 ,517 ,662 ,938 1,000  ,567 
Signification   ,826  ,037* ,000* ,049* ,051 ,001*  ,312 ,001* ,000* ,000* ,000* .  ,000* 
% Cash Flow / 
Amortization 
Provision  
Corrélation ,181  ,132 ,314 ,062 ,208 ,061  -,112 ,075 ,153 ,930 ,757 ,567 1,000 
Signification   ,235  ,386 ,035* ,688 ,169 ,689  ,465 ,626 ,314 ,000* ,000* ,000*  . 
* significant coefficients at a .05 level 
 
 